We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule that has played a central role in the previous analysis of the problem is the so-called uniform rule. Thomson (1995b) proved that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, no-envy, one-sided population-monotonicity, and replication-invariance. Replacing one-sided population-monotonicity by one-sided replacementdomination yields another characterization of the uniform rule (Thomson, 1997a). Until now, the independence of replication-invariance from the other properties in these characterizations was an open problem. In this note we prove this independence by means of a single example.
Introduction
We consider the division of some perfectly divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. This means that each agent has a most preferred amount below which and above which his welfare is decreasing. A typical example is rationing in a two-good exchange economy when prices are in disequilibrium (e.g. Benassy, 1982) : if the preferences of the agents over the two-dimensional space of bundles are strictly convex, then the restrictions of these preferences to the budget lines are single-peaked. In this context Benassy (1982) considered the uniform rationing scheme. For the more general class of division problems with single-peaked preferences, this solution is known as the uniform rule. Sprumont (1991) initiated the axiomatic analysis of this class of problems and proved that the uniform rule is the only rule that satisfies Pareto optimality, no-envy, and strategyproofness. Since then a wide literature has been concerned with the search for and analysis of rules with appealing properties. We refer the interested reader to a survey of fair allocation when preferences are single-peaked by Thomson (1997b) .
In this note we answer some questions asked by William Thomson (1995b Thomson ( , 1997a . Thomson (1995b) proves that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, no-envy, replication-invariance, and one-sided population-monotonicity. Replacing one-sided population-monotonicity by onesided replacement-domination yields another characterization of the uniform rule (Thomson, 1997a) . Until now, the independence of replication-invariance from the other properties in the characterizations mentioned above was an open problem. In this note we prove this independence by means of a single rule that satisfies the properties named in the characterizations but not replication-invariance.
The Model
In this section, we introduce the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked and the properties for rules that will play a central role.
There is an infinite population of potential agents, indexed by the natural numbers N. Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with a continuous and single-peaked preference relation R i defined over the non-negative real numbers R + . Singlepeakedness of R i means that there exists a point p(R i ) ∈ R + , called agent i's peak amount, with the following property: for all x,y ∈ R + with x < y≤p(R i ) or x > y≥p(R i ), we have yP i x. 1 Each preference relation R i can be described in terms of the indifference function r i : R + → R + ∪ {∞} that is defined as follows. If x≤p(R i ), then r i (x)≥p(R i ) and either r i (x)I i x (if such a point exists) or r i (x) = ∞. If x≥p(R i ), then r i (x)≤p(R i ) and r i (x)I i x (if such a point exists) or r i (x) = 0.
By R we denote the class of all continuous, single-peaked preference relations over R + and by R b R the subclass of preferences R i ∈ R b such that the corresponding indifference function r i is bounded, i.e., r i (0) < ∞. By N we denote the class of non-empty and finite subsets of N. For N ∈ N , R N denotes the set of (preference) profiles R = (R i ) i∈N such that for all i ∈ N, R i ∈ R; R N b has a similar meaning. Now, an economy can be formalized as follows. Let Ω ∈ R + be the amount of an infinitely divisible commodity, the (social) endowment, that has to be distributed among a group of agents N ∈ N with profile R ∈ R N . 2 We call a pair e = (R,Ω) ∈ R N × R + an economy. Let E N = R N × R + be the class of all economies for N ∈ N . Similarly, let
rule is a function ϕ that assigns to every N ∈ N and every e ∈ E N a feasible allocation, denoted ϕ(e). Given i ∈ N, we call ϕ i (e) the allotment of agent i.
A standard requirement is Pareto optimality: an allocation assigned by the rule cannot be changed in such a way that no agent is worse off and some agent is better off.
Pareto optimality: For all N ∈ N and all e ∈ E N , there is no feasible allocation x ∈ R N + such that for all i ∈ N, x i R i ϕ i (e) and for some j ∈ N, x j P j ϕ j (e). By the single-peakedness of the preferences it is easy to show that a rule is Pareto optimal if and only if it is same-sided, that is: for all N ∈ N and all e ∈ E N , either [for all i ∈ N, ϕ i (e)≤p(R i )] or [for all i ∈ N, ϕ i (e)≥p(R i )]. Sprumont (1991) uses same-sidedness as definition of Pareto optimality.
The following well-known property of no-envy states that no agent strictly prefers the allotment of another agent to his own allotment.
No-envy: For all N ∈ N , all e ∈ E N , and all i, j ∈ N, ϕ i (e)R i ϕ j (e).
Next, we discuss so-called "solidarity properties" that describe the effect of certain changes in a single parameter of the economy while the other parameters are kept fixed, e.g., the population or the preferences. Thomson (1995b Thomson ( , 1997a shows that these properties are generally incompatible with the properties we introduced above. However, he shows that these incompatibilities only occur when the change in the parameter is such that it turns an economy in which there is "too much" to divide into an economy in which there is "too little" to divide, or vice versa. We call a change where this does not occur one-sided:
, then¯e is a one-sided change of e.
¯¯T
homson shows that a wide class of rules satisfies one or even several "onesided" versions of the solidarity properties, i.e., solidarity is only required for onesided changes.
First, we consider arrivals of new agents such that the implied change in the initial economy is one-sided, keeping the preferences of the remaining agents and the endowment fixed (Thomson, 1995b) . One-sided population-monotonicity states that either all agents initially present (weakly) lose or all (weakly) gain. 3 Let N,M ∈ N , N⊆M, and R ∈ R M . Then, the restriction (R i ) i∈N ∈ R N of R to N is denoted by R N .
One-sided population-monotonicity: For all N,¯N ∈ N , all e = (R,Ω) ∈ E N , and all¯e = (¯R,Ω) ∈ E¯N, if N⊆¯N, R =¯R N , and¯e is a one-sided change of e, then either
Next, we consider a one-sided change of one agent's preference relation, keeping the preferences of the remaining agents, the set of agents, and the endowment fixed (Thomson, 1997a) . Welfare-domination under preferencereplacement, or replacement-domination for short, states that either all remaining agents (weakly) lose or all (weakly) gain. 4 For N,M ∈ N with N⊆M let M\N := {i ∈ M | i / ∈ N}. Let N ∈ N , R,¯R ∈ R N , and j ∈ N. If R N\{ j} =¯R N\{ j} and R j =¯R j , then we call¯R a j-deviation from R.
One-sided replacement-domination: For all N ∈ N , all e = (R,Ω),¯e = (¯R,Ω) ∈ E N , and all j ∈ N, if¯R is a j-deviation from R and¯e is a one-sided change of e, then either [for all i ∈ N\{ j}, ϕ i (e)R i ϕ i (e)] or [for all i ∈ N\{ j}, ϕ i (e)R i ϕ i (e)].
As a last property we introduce replication-invariance (Thomson, 1995b (Thomson, , 1997a . Replication-invariance states that if an economy is replicated, i.e., the amount to divide and the preference profile are replicated, then the replica of the allocation assigned by the rule for the initial economy equals the allocation assigned by the rule for the replicated economy. Since replication-invariance is a well-known property and its formal description is somewhat cumbersome, for a formal statement we refer to Thomson (1995b Thomson ( , 1997a . We call an economy¯e, obtained by replication of an economy e, a replica of e. Similarly, we call an allocation¯x obtained by replication of an allocation x, a replica of x.
Replication-invariance: For all N,¯N ∈ N and all e = (R,Ω) ∈ E N ,¯e = (¯R,¯Ω) ∈ E¯N, if¯e is a replica of e, then ϕ(e) is a replica of ϕ(e).
Replication-Invariance and the Uniform Rule
In this section we first introduce the uniform rule and the characterizations of this rule that lead to the question whether replication-invariance in these characterizations is independent from the other properties.
The Uniform Rule
The following rule, known as the uniform rule, has played a central role in the literature of fair division when preferences are single-peaked.
Uniform rule U: For all N ∈ N , all e = (R,Ω) ∈ E N , and all j ∈ N,
So, in case of excess demand, i.e., ∑ N p(R i )≥Ω, each agent either receives his peak amount or his allotment is greater than or equal to the allotment of each other agent. Similarly, in case of excess supply, i.e., ∑ N p(R i )≤Ω, each agent either receives his peak amount or his allotment is smaller than or equal to the allotment of each other agent.
Another interpretation of this rule is the following "Walrasian interpretation". All agents are asked to maximize their preferences subject to a common upper or lower "budget bound" that is chosen such that feasibility is obtained for this list of maximizers. 5
Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule and Two Questions
Thomson establishes the following characterization of the uniform rule (Thomson, 1995b, Theorem 4) .
Theorem 1 (Thomson, 1995b) . On the domain N∈N E N b , the uniform rule is the only rule that satisfies Pareto optimality, no-envy, one-sided population-monotonicity, and replication-invariance.
Question 1: Following the proof of this theorem, Thomson asks whether replication-invariance is independent from the other characterizing properties (see Thomson, 1995b, page 242) . 6 The next characterization of the uniform rule is due to Thomson (1997a, Theorem 1) .
Theorem 2 (Thomson, 1997a) . On the domain N∈N E N , the uniform rule is the only rule that satisfies Pareto optimality, no-envy, one-sided replacement-domination, and replication-invariance.
Question 2: Following the proof of this theorem, Thomson asks whether replication-invariance is independent from the other characterizing properties Thomson (see 1997a, page 161) .
With the following theorem we give the answers to Questions 1 and 2.
Theorem 3. There exists a rule that satisfies Pareto optimality, no-envy, one-sided population-monotonicity, one-sided replacement-domination, but not replicationinvariance.
We prove Theorem 3 by constructing the so-called absorbing agent rule. To this end, we introduce some notation. Let N ∈ N . Then, by A N E N we denote the following subclass of economies: for e = (R,Ω) ∈ A N we have that (i) there is too much to distribute, i.e., z(e) < 0 and (ii) there is exactly one agent, namely agent j ∈ N, with a relatively large peak amount p(R j ) > Ω 2 (see Figure 1 ). For such an economy e ∈ A N , we construct the allocation assigned at e as follows.
We start from the uniform allocation U(e) and let agent j "absorb" some part of the excess supply the remaining agents, i ∈ N\{ j}, experience at their uniform allotments, denoted by the list (U i (e)) i∈N\{ j} . We denote the excess supply of the agents in N\{ j} at the allocation U(e) by s j (e) = ∑ N\{ j} (U i (e) − p(R i )).
Note that in order to preserve same-sidedness, we let agent j absorb at most s j (e). However, when we let agent j absorb part, or even the whole, of the excess supply s j (e), we do not want him to envy the other agents. Therefore, we introduce 6 Thomson also asks the question whether the uniform rule is the only rule that satisfies Pareto optimality, individual rationality from equal division, one-sided population-monotonicity, and replication-invariance.
The answer is that there is a large class of rules satisfying the properties mentioned in the question. Examples are the "proportional reallocation rule" Pr r operated from equal division and the "maximally satiating reallocation rule" operated from equal division (Klaus, 1998, Klaus, Peters, and Storcken, 1998 and therefore, as long as agent j's allotment is between his peak amount p(R j ) and r j ( Ω 2 ), he does not envy the other agents. Summarizing, if N ∈ N and e = (R,Ω) ∈ A N , then we obtain the allocation assigned by the absorbing agent rule from U(e) by letting agent j absorb the amount a(e) := min{s j (e),r j ( Ω 2 ) − p(R j )} and subtracting this amount as equally as possible (with the agents' peak amount as lower bounds) from the uniform allotments of the other agents (see Figures 2 and 3) . We denote this allocation by ϕ a (e). If N ∈ N and e = (R,Ω) / ∈ A N , then we apply the uniform rule.
The absorbing agent rule ϕ a : For all N ∈ N and all e = (R,Ω) ∈ A N , let j ∈ N be such that p(R j ) > Ω 2 . 7 Then, for all i ∈ N,
For all N ∈ N and all e = (R,Ω) ∈ E N \A N , ϕ a (e) = U(e).
The rule ϕ a is by construction same-sided and therefore Pareto optimal. Since, we either assign the uniform allocation to an economy or change the uniform allocation in such a way that envy cannot arise, ϕ a satisfies no-envy. 8 7 Recall that the absorbing agent j is unique and that a(e) := min{s j (e),r j ( Ω 2 ) − p(R j )}. 8 The absorbing agent rule ϕ a satisfies other well-known properties, such as anonymity and individual rationality from equal division. It follows easily that ϕ a satisfies none of the properties strategy-proofness, peak-onliness, one-sided resource-monotonicity, consistency, and converse consistency. For a more detailed discussion, we refer to Klaus (1998) . 
Figure 3: The rule ϕ a for an economy e ∈ A N with a(e) = r j ( 
The following remark implies that the rule ϕ a does not satisfy replicationinvariance.
Remark 1. Note that for all N ∈ N , all e = (R,Ω) ∈ E N , all k ∈ N, k≥2, and all k-replica¯e = (¯R,¯Ω) ∈ E¯N of e, if e ∈ A N , then¯e /∈ A¯N and ϕ a (e) is not a k-replica of ϕ a (e).F inally, by the following lemmas, we complete the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 1. The rule ϕ a satisfies one-sided population-monotonicity.
Lemma 2. The rule ϕ a satisfies one-sided replacement-domination.
Before we prove Lemmas 1 and 2, we introduce the solidarity property onesided resource-monotonicity (Thomson, 1994) . One-sided resource-monotonicity states that after a one-sided change of an economy that is induced by a change in the social endowment, either all agents (weakly) lose or all (weakly) gain.
One-sided resource-monotonicity: For all N ∈ N and all e = (R,Ω),¯e = (R,¯Ω) ∈ E N , if¯e is a one-sided change of e, then either [for all i ∈ N,
The uniform rule satisfies one-sided resource-monotonicity (Thomson, 1994) .
Proof of Lemma 1. Let N,¯N ∈ N , e = (R,Ω) ∈ E N , and¯e = (¯R,Ω) ∈ E¯N be such that N⊆¯N and R =¯R N . Now, it is sufficient to show that, if¯e is a onesided change of e, then either (i) [for all 
Let¯e be a one-sided change of e. Case 1: e / ∈ A N ,¯e / ∈ A¯N. Then, ϕ a (e) = U(e) and ϕ a (e) = U(e). Since, the uniform rule is one-sided population-monotonic, either (i) or (ii) holds. Case 2: e ∈ A N ,¯e /∈ A¯N. Hence, z(e)≤0, z(e) < 0, and there exists j ∈ N such that p(R j ) > Ω¯2 . Since¯e / ∈ A¯N, we have z(e) = 0. So, by Pareto optimality, for all i ∈ N, ϕ a i (e) = p(R i ). This implies (ii). Case 3: e / ∈ A N ,¯e ∈ A¯N. Hence, z(e)≤z(e) < 0 and there exists j ∈¯N\N such that p(¯R j ) > Ω¯2 . Let R =¯R¯N \{ j} ∈ R¯N \{ j} . Then, for all i ∈ N, ϕ a i (e) = U i (e) and ϕ a i (e) = U i (R ,Ω − ϕ a j (e)).¯(1) Since the uniform rule is one-sided resource-monotonic and (R ,Ω), (R ,Ω − ϕ a j (e)) ∈ E¯N \{ j} are such that ∑¯N \{ j} p(R i )≤Ω − ϕ a j (e) < Ω, it follows that for all i ∈ N⊆¯N\{ j},Ū
Since the uniform rule is one-sided population-monotonic and e = (R,Ω) ∈ E N , (R ,Ω) ∈ E¯N \{ j} are such that N⊆¯N\{ j}, R = R N , and ∑¯N \{ j} p(R i )≤Ω, it follows that for all i ∈ N, U i (R ,Ω)R i U i (e).¯(3)
Thus, (1), (2), and (3) together imply that for all i ∈ N, ϕ a i (e)R i ϕ a i (e). Hence, (ii) holds. Case 4:ē ∈ A N ,¯e ∈ A¯N. Hence, z(e)≤z(e) < 0 and there exists j ∈ N⊆¯N such that p(
Note that U j (e) = p(R j ) = U j (e).¯¯Therefore, Ω − U j (e) = ∑ N\{ j} U i (e) = ∑¯N \{ j} U i (e) and s j (e)≥s j (e). Hence, a(e)≥a(e) and p(R j )≤ϕ a j (e)≤ϕ a j (e). Thus,φ a j (e)R j ϕ a j (e).
(5)N ow, we have either (a) a(e) = s j (e) or (b) a(e) = r j ( Ω2 ) − p(R j ).
Suppose (a) holds. Then, for all i ∈ N\{ j}, ϕ a i (e) = p(R i ). Thus, for all i ∈ N\{ j},φ
Hence, (5) and (6) imply (ii). Suppose (b) holds.¯Then, a(e) = a(e) and Ω − ϕ a j (e) = Ω − ϕ a j (e). Since the uniform rule is one-sided population-monotonic and (R ,Ω − ϕ a j (e)) ∈Ē N\{ j} , (¯R ,Ω − ϕ a j (e)) ∈ E¯N \{ j} are such that N\{ j}⊆¯N\{ j}, R =¯R N\{ j} , and ∑¯N \{ j} p(¯R i )≤Ω − ϕ a j (e), it follows that for all i ∈ N\{ j},
Thus, by (4), for all i ∈ N\{ j},φ
Hence, (5) and (8) imply (ii).
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roof of Lemma 2. Let N ∈ N , e = (R,Ω) ∈ E N ,¯e = (¯R,Ω) ∈ E N , and k ∈ N be such that¯R is a k-deviation from R. It is sufficient to show that if¯e is a onesided change of e, then either (i) [for all i ∈ N\{k}, ϕ i (e)R i ϕ i (e)] or (ii) [for all i ∈ N\{k}, ϕ a i (e)R i ϕ a i (e)]. Let¯e be a one-sided change of e. Case 1: e / ∈ A N ,¯e / ∈ A N . Then, ϕ a (e) = U(e) and ϕ a (e) = U(e). Since, the uniform rule satisfies one-sided replacement-domination, either (i) or (ii) holds. Case 2: e / ∈ A N ,¯e ∈ A N . Hence,¯R and R are such that
Since the uniform rule is one-sided resource-monotonic and (R ,Ω − U k (e)),
, it follows that for all i ∈ N\{k},
Hence, (9) and (10) imply (ii). Case 3: e ∈ A N ,¯e / ∈ A N . Similar to Case 2 by interchanging the roles of¯R and R.C ase 4: e ∈ A N ,¯e ∈ A N . Without loss of generality we assume that¯R is a kdeviation from R such that p(¯R k )≥p(R k ). Hence, z(e)≤z(e) < 0 and there exists j ∈ N such that p(R j ) > 
ϕ a i (e) = p(¯R j ) + a(e)¯if i = j, U i (¯R ,Ω − ϕ a j (e)) if i ∈ N\{ j}.C ase 4.1: k = j. Since the uniform rule is one-sided resource-monotonic and (R ,Ω − ϕ a j (e)), (¯R ,Ω − ϕ a j (e)) ∈ E N\{ j} are such that R =¯R and z(R ,Ω − ϕ a j (e)) ≤0 and z((¯R ,Ω − ϕ a j (e)) ≤0, it follows that for all i ∈ N\{ j}, either (i) or (ii). Case 4.2: k = j. Since p(¯R k )≥p(R k ), it follows that s j (e)≥s j (e). Hence, a(e)≥ a(e) and ϕ a j (e)≤ϕ a j (e). Thus, ϕ a j (e)R j ϕ a j (e).
¯N ow, we have either (a) a(e) = s j (e) or (b) a(e) = r j ( Ω2 ) − p(R j ).
Suppose (a) holds. Hence, for all i ∈ N\{ j}, ϕ a i (e) = p(R i ). Thus, for all i ∈ N\{ j,k},φ a i (e)R i ϕ a i (e).
(13)H ence, (12) and (13) imply (ii). Suppose (b) holds. Hence, a(e) = a(e) and Ω − ϕ a j (e) = Ω − ϕ a j (e). Since the uniform rule satisfies one-sided replacement-domination and (R ,Ω − ϕ a j (e)), (¯R ,Ω−ϕ a j (e)) ∈ E N\{ j} , k ∈ N, are such that p(¯R k )≥p(R k ) and R N \{k} =¯R N \{k} , it follows that for all i ∈ N \{k} = N\{ j,k},
Thus, by (11) and (14), for all i ∈ N\{ j,k},
Hence, (12) and (15) imply (ii). Now, Remark 1, together with Lemmas 1 and 2 establish the proof of Theorem 3. Thomson, W. (1995b) : "Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked," Economic Theory, 5, 229-246. Thomson, W. (1997a) : "The replacement principle in economies with singlepeaked preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, 76, 145-168. Thomson, W. (1997b) 
